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Abstract  
Using material, ideational, and geopolitical power Egypt used to control the conduct of its southern 
neighbors, particularly Sudan, in the utilization of the Nile River waters. Recent regional and domestic 
transformations in the Middle East and Horn of Africa, particularly after the ‘Arab Uprisings’ of 2011, 
have undermined Egypt’s influence and reshaped the hydro political landscape in the Nile basin. As a 
result, Sudan and Ethiopia are now influential actors in the Nile basin who play central roles in the 
Middle East-Horn of Africa relations. The academic literature and news coverage of the water dispute 
between Egypt and Ethiopia overlook the Sudan’s strategic position as a midstream state that has 
accelerated the basin’s hydro political shift in Ethiopia’s favor. The paper argues that Egypt’s loss of 
Sudan’s unconditional and explicit support for its “water rights,” recognized by the 1929 and 1959 
water agreements, has changed the former’s long-standing hegemonic position in the Nile basin in 
favor of upstream states. The paper contends that Sudan’s changing position over the Nile hydro 
politics has been the result of three main major developments. First, the decline of Egypt’s material and 
ideational power in the Middle East and Africa. Second, Egypt’s foreign policy goals have been 
constrained due to its massive economic dependence on the Gulf oil-rich states that seek to improve 
their food security and regional interests through increasing their physical, political and economic 
presence in Sudan and Ethiopia. And third, Egypt’s former hydrological veto power over construction 
projects on the Nile has ended as new power relations between upstream, downstream, and non-riparian 
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Using material, ideational, and geopolitical power Egypt used to control the conduct of its 
southern neighbors, particularly Sudan, in the utilization of the Nile River waters. Recent 
regional and domestic transformations in the Middle East and Horn of Africa, particularly 
after the ‘Arab Uprisings’ of 2011, have undermined Egypt’s influence and reshaped the 
hydro political landscape in the Nile basin. As a result, Sudan and Ethiopia are now 
influential actors in the Nile basin who play central roles in the Middle East-Horn of 
Africa relations. The academic literature and news coverage of the water dispute between 
Egypt and Ethiopia overlook the Sudan’s strategic position as a midstream state that has 
accelerated the basin’s hydro political shift in Ethiopia’s favor. The paper argues that 
Egypt’s loss of Sudan’s unconditional and explicit support for its “water rights,” 
recognized by the 1929 and 1959 water agreements, has changed the former’s 
long-standing hegemonic position in the Nile basin in favor of upstream states. The paper 
contends that Sudan’s changing position over the Nile hydro politics has been the result 
of three main major developments. First, the decline of Egypt’s material and ideational 
power in the Middle East and Africa. Second, Egypt’s foreign policy goals have been 
constrained due to its massive economic dependence on the Gulf oil-rich states that seek 
to improve their food security and regional interests through increasing their physical, 
political and economic presence in Sudan and Ethiopia. And third, Egypt’s former 
hydrological veto power over construction projects on the Nile has ended as new power 
relations between upstream, downstream, and non-riparian states reconfigured the 
regional order of the Nile basin in favor of upstream riparian states.     
Keywords: Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Hydro-politics 
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The Nile River is inseparable from Egypt’s very identity and existence. Not only 
are the river and its aquifers almost the only sources of Egypt’s drinking and irrigation 
waters (Ashour et al. 2009), the Nile is pivotal to the unification of a highly centralized 
state along its fertile banks. Historically, Egypt controlled the Nile’s upstream waters 
with a combination of material, ideational, geopolitical resources, and external support. 
Most of the upstream states could not use the Nile waters much except for Sudan with its 
vast agricultural potential. For Egypt, therefore, to control Sudan was to control the Nile. 
Until recently Sudan was Egypt’s ally in managing the Nile waters, even when diplomatic 
relations between the two states were strained. Lately, though, Sudan has lessened its 
support for Egypt. In the wake of the 2010 Arab uprisings, geopolitical shifts in the 
Middle East and Horn of Africa reduced Egypt’s capacity to dictate the regional Nile 
water agenda. Sudan decided that its water-resource management schemes and economic 
development depended on its cooperation with upstream riparian states. Egypt is 
presently isolated, struggling to replace its former ‘hydro-hegemony’ with a new strategy 
for the Nile basin. In the process, Egypt-Sudan relations have come under considerable 
strain. 
The paper contends that Sudan’s changing position over the hydro politics of the 
Nile has been the result of three main major developments. First, the decline of Egypt’s 
material and ideational power in the Middle East and Africa. Second, Egypt’s foreign 
policy goals have been constrained due to its massive economic dependence on the Gulf 
oil-rich states that seek to improve their food security and regional interests through 
increasing their physical, political and economic presence in Sudan and Ethiopia. And 
third, Egypt’s former hydrological veto power over construction projects on the Nile has 
ended as new power relations between upstream, downstream, and non-riparian states 
reconfigured the regional order of the Nile basin in favor of upstream riparian states.   
 
Egypt’s Hydro Hegemony in the Nile Basin 
In the conceptual framework of hydro hegemony developed by Mark Zeitoun and 
Jeroen Warner (2006), hydro hegemony, or the control of water, is acquired, sustained, 
and transformed based on three key factors: (1) geography or riparian position 
(upstream versus downstream); (2) hard power such as military strength; and (3) 
material power, such as infrastructural, economic and technical capability which allow 
even downstream states to exploit river resources. Subsequent analysis by Mark Zeitoun 
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and Ana Elisa Cascão (2013, 27) based hydro hegemony on four forms of power: 
“geography; material power; bargaining power; and ideational power.”1  
In the Nile basin, downstream Egypt has the least favorable geographical 
location. Its water resources originate outside its borders and enter its territory from 
Sudan. But Egypt’s disadvantage was offset by military, economic and technological 
superiority over its southern neighbors. Until recently, the Aswan High Dam (AHD), 
completed in 1970, allowed Egypt to regulate and utilize the Nile’s flow better than any 
other regional state. Within Egypt water security lay crucially in the vast water reserve 
of Lake Nasser. Having one of the largest armies in the region, Egypt could potentially 
respond militarily against any upstream state’s interference with the flow of the Nile. 
Yet Egypt did not use military power to protect its waters. As Nasser’s confidant, 
Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, once wrote in Foreign Affairs, “fortunately, with the 
political conditions and technological limitations in Central and East Africa, this threat 
(tampering with the Nile waters) is unlikely to materialize. Politically friendly Sudan 
provides Egypt with an additional degree of security” (Heikal 1977, 715). In fact Egypt 
enjoyed influence and supremacy as certain upstream states suffered structural 
weaknesses owing to proxy wars, political instability, and lack of technical capacity and 
international support for economic development. In a sense, Egypt could have remained 
the Nile basin hegemon by profiting from the political instability in upstream states. It 
was long assumed, for example, that Ethiopia, the source of the Blue Nile, which supplies 
almost two thirds of the Nile water flowing through Egypt, was too embroiled in internal 
conflicts to be able to undertake any meaningful development. Through its Western allies, 
Egypt also ensured that international lending institutions would not support the 
development of hydraulic infrastructure projects in Ethiopia (Verhoeven 2015, 153). 
Unable to use the Nile River much, the upstream states effectively ceded a monopoly over 
their waters to Egypt. Presently, though, rapid population growth, urbanization and the 
need for economic development have led the upstream countries to assert their claims to 
the Nile River.  
Previously Egypt could set the rules and agendas of the Nile’s management 
because of colonial agreements that went back to the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1902 
that recognized Egypt’s “historical and natural rights” over the river waters (Crabitès 
1929). Indeed Egypt’s bargaining power stems from its veto power inscribed in the 
1929 and 1959 water agreements with Sudan and supported by powerful states and 
international financial institutions like the IMF, World Bank and African Development 
                                                  
1 Ideational power is mainly bound up with a narrative through which actors seek strategies to 
legitimize their ideas and defend their claims to the river waters. 
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Bank (Waterbury 2008). By deploying “securitization tactics” (treating water as an 
existential security issue), Egypt could mobilize regional and international support 
against any state that might tamper with the Nile waters (Jacobs 2012, 137, Rubin 2014, 
90-91). This securitizing approach turned any debate over equal utilization of the Nile 
waters between riparian states into a matter of emergency politics. For decades, Egypt 
influenced the terms of negotiations and agreements because it offered incentives to 
weaker parties to comply with its goals. Besides, there was a knowledge gap between the 
riparian states and Egypt that enabled the latter to monopolize the production and 
dissemination of information on the Nile. Thus, Egypt had ideational power: it could 
impose its ideas and narratives and determine the agenda, discourse, and timing of 
negotiations and projects in the Nile basin (Awulachew 2012, 230).  
No less crucial to Egypt’s hydro hegemony was the geopolitical and economic 
landscape. In particular, Sudan’s vast agricultural lands could tempt it to alter the flow of 
the Nile into Egypt. Hence, Egypt invested heavily in making water agreements with 
Sudan, and not with the upstream states such as Ethiopia. And a peculiar sociopolitical 
relationship between Egypt and Sudan, as examined in the following section, guaranteed 
the latter’s compliance with the water agreements.  
 
Egypt and Sudan: A Peculiar Relationship 
Egypt once claimed Sudan as an integral part of its territory. The claim began with 
the Turco-Egyptian invasion and rule of Sudan in 1820 by Muhammad Ali Pasha who 
aspired to build an Egyptian empire. The goals of the invasion were to obtain slaves for 
military conscription, extract gold, and control the Nile Valley and the Red Sea trade 
(Sanderson 1963, Robinson 1925). Around 1820 Muhammad Ali made Khartoum, the 
capital of Sudan, a permanent military camp (Hamdan 1960). The first period of Egypt’s 
domination over Sudan ended in 1885 when Muhammad Ahmad Ibn Abdullah 
proclaimed himself the Mahdi2 (Dekmejian and Wyszomirski 1972), led a Sudanese 
rebellion against Egyptian rule and established an Islamic state (1885-1898). However, 
Egypt restored its rule over Sudan following the Anglo-Egyptian invasion in 1898 that 
defeated the Mahdist state and imposed a joint regime, the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium in 1899. The Condominium, which “recognized Sudan as an Egyptian 
possession administrated by the British officials on behalf of the King of Egypt” (Johnson 
2011, 21), ended in 1956 when Sudan gained independence. Until then, the control of 
                                                  
2 Literally, ‘redeemer of Islam’. Here, the Mahdist rebellion was a nationalist revolt against 
Anglo-Egyptian rule.  
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Sudan extended Egypt’s influence from the shores of the Mediterranean Sea deep into 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  
The Egyptian political elites had long thought that political and economic control 
of Sudan guaranteed their mastery of the Nile Valley and its resources (Crabitès 1934). 
Sudan’s importance to Egypt’s strategic interests was expressed by an Egyptian army 
general in 1949 thus:  
No politician can ignore Egypt’s interest in the Sudan. Its permanent and vital 
interest concerns Egypt’s life. Egypt gets its water from the Nile which flows in 
the heart of the Sudan. The Nile to Egypt is a matter of life and death. If the water 
of the river were controlled by a hostile state or a state that could become a hostile 
state, Egypt’s life is over. Of course, whoever controls the Sudan naturally 
controls the Northern Nile Valley. Egypt in this era of conflicting political 
doctrines cannot trust the neighbors of the Sudan. Today’s friends may become 
tomorrow’s enemies. For this reason, all of Egypt’s efforts are to secure life in the 
coming future (Ismael 1969, 1). 
 
In fact, Egyptian elites regularly demanded of Great Britain that Egypt and Sudan 
should be unified under the “Egyptian crown” (Abushouk 2010, 220). On 28 June 1924, 
the leader of Egypt’s nationalist Wafd Party, Prime Minister Sa‘d Zaghlul Pasha, stated in 
the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies,  
This is our situation in respect to the Sudan: We spend money there, we shed 
blood there, we endure hardships there, and our fathers endured such before 
us, and we draw life from that river which pours forth from the highest 
reaches of the Sudan. In any case, it is impossible, unless we were a lifeless 
people, that we leave one speck of the Sudan for others (Mills 2014, 11). 
John Waterbury (1979, 11) correctly notes that, “The Egyptian outlook on the 
Sudan has traditionally been colonialist… backed by its heavy military preponderance… 
[L]atent feelings of superiority and inferiority still underlie relations between the two 
states.” Until the mid-twentieth century the two states could not have a genuine political 
partnership (Powell 2003) because a refusal to relinquish its control of Sudan was key to 
Egypt’s geopolitical status. In fact Egypt continued to keep independent Sudan within its 
sphere of influence, manipulating the stability and, sometimes, the survival of Sudanese 
regimes.  
Ironically its sole preoccupation with controlling Sudan undermined Egypt’s ability 
to develop cooperation with all riparian states in a comprehensive policy for governing 
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the entire Nile system. Indeed, an absence of mutual trust between Egypt and Sudan 
preempted a hydro political alliance between them based on a long-term equitable share 
of the Nile waters. Consequently Egypt found itself disadvantaged when the upstream 
riparian states asserted their rights to use the Nile waters to develop their economies. 
  
Egypt-Sudan Relations in Post-Colonial Era 
Post-colonial Egyptian-Sudanese relations were uneasy and at times antagonistic, 
partly a hangover from Britain’s colonial policies that favored Egypt as an agricultural 
asset and relied on the Suez Canal to support the British economy and maritime power. 
For example, a 1902 treaty between Britain and Ethiopia to settle the Sudan-Ethiopia 
border forbade Ethiopia, without consent from Britain and Sudan, from constructing any 
infrastructural project on the Blue Nile that would limit the flow of its water. The Nile 
Water Agreement (NWA) of 1929 between Egypt and Britain on behalf of Sudan 
allocated 48 billion cubic meters of river water per annum for Egypt but only 4 billion 
cubic meters for Sudan. The same agreement gave Egypt the right to veto any project 
beyond its national border that was higher up the Nile. In 1937 the Jebel Aulia Dam was 
constructed south of Khartoum to store water for eventual use in Egypt3 (Yihdego, 
Rieu-Clarke, and Cascão 2017). Britain’s post-WWII decline left Egypt dominant in the 
Nile basin. When the Free Officers seized power in Egypt on 23 July 1952, they soon 
decided to build the AHD close to the border with Sudan without informing the latter. The 
dam reservoir, Lake Nasser, extended 150 km into Sudan (Negm 2017), flooding towns 
and villages. The revolutionary government of the Free Officers decided that securing the 
Nile flow and building the AHD (1960-70) quickly would gain the crucial support of the 
peasanty (fellahin).  
Independent Sudan was a parliamentary democracy, albeit beset by severe political 
instability and deep north-south divisions (Hasabu and Majid 1985, Warburg 2003, Daly 
2003). An unresolved dispute over the Halayeb Triangle (southeastern 
Egypt/northeastern Sudan border area) fed mistrust and resentment between Egypt and 
Sudan. In Sudan, the elites drew political capital, authority, and legitimacy from standing 
up to Egypt (1956 and 1958). With popular anti-Anglo-Egyptian sentiment behind it, the 
government announced its intention to assert its sovereign rights over the Blue Nile. The 
parliament wanted to abrogate the 1929 NWA and withhold consent from AHD. In 
Sudan’s view its future water requirements were compromised by Egypt’s water security. 
                                                  
3 The Jebel Aulia Dam was later returned to Sudan in 1977 after it became obsolete due to the 
completion of Aswan High Dam in 1971.  
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The standoff threatened the construction of AHD and a new legal water agreement that 
would meet the demands of the financiers of the AHD (Saleh 2008, 39-41).  
The standoff ended in 1958. Egypt sent its military to the disputed Halayeb while 
in Sudan the pro-Egyptian General Ibrahim Abboud (who served in the Egyptian military 
before independence) overthrew the anti-Egyptian Umma government of Abdullah 
Khalil. A year later, the Nile Waters Agreement4 was concluded which allocated to both 
countries the entire flow of the Nile as measured at Aswan, and granted Egypt the right to 
construct the AHD without regard of the interests of the other riparian states (Deng 2007). 
One outcome of the agreement was a sharp divide between upstream and downstream 
states. The 1959 Agreement effectively enforced the 1929 Agreement, granting Egypt 
and Sudan larger quotas of the river flow – 55.5 billion cubic meters (BCM) for Egypt,5 
and 18.5 BCM for Sudan,6 out of a total 84 BCM, with 10 BCM lost to evaporation from 
the AHD’s reservoir. The AHD and other projects on the Nile submerged the old 
Sudanese town of Wadi Halfa and displaced tens of thousands of people, mainly Nubians 
living on both sides of the state line (Wiebe 2001, 737).  
With a total storage capacity of 162 BCM, the AHD paved the road to Egypt’s 
national development, providing energy and regular water for its agriculture and 
protecting Egyptians against annual floods and droughts (Shama 2013, 27). The 1959 
Agreement expanded Egypt’s influence south of its borders and granted Egypt the power 
to monitor the use of the Nile water in Sudan and veto any water development project that 
would affect the flow of its water allocation (Deng 2007). Crucially, the Agreement 
secured Egypt’s hydro-hegemonic position by reinforcing the concept of Egypt’s “natural 
and historic” rights to the Nile and limiting Sudan’s future demands for more water and 
irrigation development. The hydro political Egyptian-Sudanese alliance remained strong 
until the early 1990s.  
Sudan-Egypt relations reached new heights when a Free Officers Organization 
staged a bloodless coup in Sudan on May 25, 1969 that brought Ja’far al-Nimeiri to power. 
                                                  
4 The Agreement was met with strong opposition in Sudan as the construction of the AHD 
entailed the flooding of Wadi Halfa region and consequently, the displacement of thousands of 
people (Spaulding et al. 2010, 110-111). 
5 In 1959, Egypt’s population was about 27 million. Now it nears 100 million.  
6 Many Nile experts, such as Robert Collins and S.A.M Salman, are skeptical about Sudan’s 
actual use of its 18.5 BCM water allocation. Salman notes that in 2011 the Sudanese Minister of 
Irrigation and Water Resources stated that Sudan has had only been using 12 BCM (Salman 
2018, 90).  
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The Nimeiri regime modelled itself after Nasser’s pan-Arab revolution. A special 
relationship flourished under Anwar Sadat when Sudan and Egypt signed the Alexandria 
Agreement in February 1974. The agreement sealed their political and economic 
integration, and defense and security cooperation, the strongest between Egypt and any 
other country (Khālid 2003, 173). A stalwart USA ally during the Cold War, Nimeiri’s 
Sudan followed Sadat’s Egypt in expelling its Soviet military advisors in June 1977 and 
replacing them with Egyptians, Chinese and Yugoslavs (Hoffmann and Fleron 1971, 
498-499). Sudan was one of the three countries, along with Oman and Somalia, which 
stood by Sadat after Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel, on March 26, 1979. In 1983, 
Egypt and Sudan signed an Economic Integration Charter and convened a Joint 
Egypt-Sudan Nile Valley Parliament. When hostilities broke out between Libya and 
Sudan in March 1984, Mubarak sent military forces and advisors to bolster Sudan’s 
defenses (Simons 1996, 303). A stable but weak pro-Egyptian in Khartoum gave Cairo 
leverage over the Nile water supply. Warm relations with Egypt, the USA, and Saudi 
Arabia made Sudan the second-largest African recipient of US aid after Egypt. But 
Egyptian-Sudanese relations deteriorated after Brigadier Umar Hasan al-Bashir ousted 
the civilian government of Sadiq al-Mahdi on June 30, 1989. 
  
Egypt and Revolutionary Sudan in the 1990s 
Unhappy with Mahdi’s good relations with Libya and Iran, Egypt was the first 
state to recognize Bashir’s government. Bashir, a graduate of the Egyptian military 
academy, needed Egypt’s support to consolidate his rule. Later, however, the Egyptian 
leaders found that Bashir’s coup was masterminded by Hasan al-Turabi’s National 
Islamic Front (NIF) that evolved into the National Congress Party (NCP). The new 
regime established an Islamic republic that sought to undermine the Mubarak regime. 
Bashir’s Islamist foreign policy led him to an alliance with Hasan al-Turabi, who took 
the Iranian revolution for his model (Burr and Collins 2003). A major part of the new 
regime's foreign policy was to support Islamic activism throughout the Muslim world. 
Egypt’s fear of Sudan promoting its Islamist ideology coincided with a resurgence of 
the militant Islamic Group (al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya) in Egypt during much of the 1990s. 
As its tourism industry was devastated by a spate of attacks by militant groups, Egypt 
watched with alarm as Khartoum imposed strict sharia law on Muslims and Christians 
alike, hosted Al-Qaeda’s Osama Bin Laden, provided refuge and training to militant 
Egyptian Islamists, and, under the pretext of Jihad, declared a brutal war on the south of 
Sudan (De Waal and Salam 2004).  
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Sudan under Bashir was isolated. It supported Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and lost 
US military and financial assistance. It turned to Iran for its most important ally and the 
two states reached a security pact by which Tehran provided Khartoum with oil, 
weapons, and financial assistance (Tekle 1996, 503-504). To counter Iran, however, 
Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia backed Eritrea in its conflict with Sudan. The anti-Bashir 
states in the region increased their support for the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army 
(SPLA) and the anti-Bashir forces in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) that was 
founded in 1989 (Hassan 1993). With material aid from the USA and its allies, the 
SPLA increased its military capacity and strengthened its political and military alliance 
with opposition groups in northern Sudan (Haywood 2014, 151-152). These 
developments cut the Bashir regime from its Arab and African neighbors, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and foreign investments (Kevane and 
Gray 1995, 274). Sudanese-Egyptian relations deteriorated when a Sudanese-backed 
militant Islamist group in 1995 attempted to assassinate Hosni Mubarak as he attended 
an African summit in Addis Ababa. Egypt accused Hasan al-Turabi of plotting the 
attempted assassination while the Ethiopian government severed diplomatic relations 
with Sudan. Egypt managed to have the United Nations Security Council impose 
sanctions on Sudan which the USA added to its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism 
(Woodward 2016, 30-31). Tension between Egypt and Sudan led to a flare-up of an old 
border dispute. In 1992, a Canadian oil company received a concession from Sudan to 
conduct oil exploration in the disputed “Halayeb Triangle” region. Cairo swiftly 
deployed its troops to annex the area (Barltrop 2011, 115). Egypt’s material power and 
international alliances isolated Sudan throughout the 1990s. Sudan failed to restore its 
sovereignty over the disputed area despite threatening to interfere with the flow of the 
Nile River (Adar and Check 2011, 52). From January to April 1996 the UN Security 
Council, of which Egypt was a non-permanent member, compelled Sudan to extradite 
suspects in the attempted assassination of Mubarak, imposed travel and diplomatic 
sanctions on the Bashir regime and members of the Sudanese armed forces, and later 
enforced an air embargo on Sudan Airways, which shut Sudan off from airline 
manufacturing industries (Mikhail 2008, 99-100). Sudan’s only challenge to the 
regional order maintained by Egypt was to undermine the security of the Mubarak 
regime by supporting Islamist militant groups and aspiring to build a united Islamic 
front.  
Bashir soon found his alliance with Egypt’s adversaries to be economically and 
politically unsustainable. He had no other way to manage Sudan’s deteriorating 
economy and end its position as an international ‘pariah’ except to mend relations with 
Egypt and its allies. Only then could Sudan secure aid from the Gulf Arab states. Osama 
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Bin Laden and a number of Islamic groups and al-Jihad leaders were asked to leave 
Sudan. Relations with Egypt improved when Sudan ended its confrontational Islamist 
foreign policy. In 1999, Khartoum extradited a suspect in the attempted assassination of 
Mubarak to Egypt, cut its ties with Hasan al-Turabi and later arrested him. In 2000, 
Khartoum and Cairo exchanged ambassadors after a five-year break and Egypt resumed 
trade and restored diplomatic relations with Sudan. In September 2001, with Egyptian 
support, the UN Security Council lifted its sanctions on Sudan.7 The removal of 
al-Turabi facilitated peace talks with the Sudanese People’s Liberation 
Army/Movement (SPLA/M) held in Kenya (De Waal 2004), that produced a 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. On its part, Egypt rallied the 
Gulf Arab states and other African countries behind Bashir’s new alignments. Sudan 
re-established contact with the USA which unfroze the assets of Salah Idris, the owner 
of the El Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum that the USA bombed in 1998.8  
For decades, Egypt constrained post-independent Sudan’s political development. The 
latter, suffering prolonged civil wars, failed to maintain a stable, centralized state. 
Against Egypt’s superior force, coercive diplomacy, and strong relations with world 
powers, Sudan had to comply with its obligations under their bilateral water agreements. 
The situation changed, however, as Egypt’s regional influence declined due to domestic 
politics and geopolitical realignments in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.  
 
Egypt’s Dwindling Hydro Hegemony 
In the past decade, Egypt’s hydro hegemony in the Nile basin declined because 
of domestic economic and political instability, and long-term shifts in the regional 
balance of power. Several developments were especially important.  
Firstly, with Nasser’s death in 1970, Egypt departed from pan-African ideas of 
liberation. Nasser had advocated African unity, offered refuge to African exiles, and 
given African independence fighters material, logistic and political support (Akinsanya 
1976). During the 1950s and 1960s, Egypt enlarged its pan-Arab anti-imperialist front 
against Britain. However, Egypt’s anti-western and anti-Israel foreign policies depleted 
its economic and financial capital. Above all, Egypt forfeited its leadership of the Arab 
world after its humiliating defeat in the 1967 war against Israel. Moreover, domestic 
and regional actors questioned the very foundation of the Egyptian model of 
development in the face of widespread protests against high levels of poverty in Egypt.  
                                                  
7 “Security Council Lifts Sanctions against Sudan,” United Nations, 28 September 2001. 
8 “US admits Sudan bombing mistake,” Independent, 4 May 1999. 
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Secondly, a series of international events took a steady toll on Egypt’s regional 
position. After the war with Israel in 1973, Anwar Sadat reoriented Egypt towards the 
West. He made peace with Israel and broke with the Arab and African worlds. He chose 
integration with the emerging US-led globalized economy, and Egypt gained economic 
aid and access to international financial institutions. As an Egyptian diplomat noted, 
“Sadat is a Westerner, his dream is that his country would become part of Europe. 
Belonging to Europe is more important than belonging to Africa or the Arab world” 
(Ajami 1979). Besides, the oil price shocks of the 1970s massively shifted wealth to the 
Gulf Arab states but deepened Egypt’s economic dependence on the GCC economies. 
And the end of the Cold War marginalized Africa’s position while Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait divided the Arab world over the USA-led war against Iraq.  
In the Nile basin, to stop the riparian states from tampering with the Nile waters, 
Egypt increasingly relied on coercive diplomacy which further undermined its soft 
power in Africa. Indeed Sadat threatened to use military force against Ethiopia in 1978 
when he stated,  
(A)ny action that would endanger the waters of the Blue Nile will be faced 
with a firm reaction on the part of Egypt, even if that action should lead to 
war. As the Nile waters issue is one of life and death for my people, I feel I 
must urge the United States to speed up the delivery of the promised military 
aid so that Egypt might not be caught napping (Kendie 1999, 141). 
Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, was preoccupied with regime security and 
his hold on power. Mubarak’s foreign policy was directed towards the status quo of an 
alliance with the US that would aid badly needed economic development at home 
(Shama 2013, 41-42). Egypt showed little enthusiasm for the African Union and viewed 
Africa through a security prism. After the attempt on his life in 1995, Mubarak did not 
attend African summits until the Abuja summit of 2005 (Landsberg and Van Wyk 2012, 
245). At those summits, Ethiopia rallied the upstream Nile states to review the 1929 and 
1959 Nile water agreements and get recognition of their right to equal share and 
utilization of the Nile waters. While the upstream states challenged the existing hydro 
hegemonic setting, Egypt was very inward-focused as Mubarak was preoccupied with 
grooming his son to succeed him.9 The Egyptian leadership seemed to believe that the 
downstream states were too underfinanced to develop the infrastructure needed to 
increase their utilization of the Nile waters. Mubarak showed little interest in economic 
                                                  
9 Author interview with Michael Wahid Hanna, New York, The Century Foundation, 16 
January 2020.  
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integration with African countries, and the Nile basin countries in particular (Tawfik 
2016). Consequently Egypt barely had a role in negotiations that led to the secession of 
South Sudan in 2011, which Egypt had long opposed, fearing a threat to its water supply 
from a new riparian state (Prendergast and Mozersky 2004, 72).  
 Thirdly, a new order emerged in the Nile basin based on the power relations 
between the upstream and downstream states. The upstream riparian states raised their 
hydro political cooperation in legal and institutional terms. But Egypt refused to join 
new initiatives regarding the distribution and utilization of the Nile waters, which 
strengthened the collective bargaining power of upstream countries. The Nile basin 
Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), signed in 2010 by Uganda, Ethiopia, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, and Burundi, granted autonomy to upstream states to decide 
Nile projects without Egypt’s prior consent (Salman 2013). In response, Egypt froze its 
membership in the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) that was formed in 1999 to develop the 
river in a cooperative manner. The NBI was the first cooperative agreement to include 
all riparian states along with Ethiopia and Egypt. But Egypt’s action preempted 
cooperation or negotiation with Ethiopia, which annually supplies more than 85 percent 
of the Egypt’s Nile waters. Egypt’s apprehension over losing its “historical water rights” 
and veto power lies behind its reluctance to participate in new treaties that would equally 
recognize the water right of all riparian states. Egypt appears not to have noticed that the 
time had passed when its 1929 and 1959 agreements with Sudan allowed Egypt to be the 
hegemon of the Nile basin. 
Meanwhile, the recent economic ascendency and relative political stability of the 
upstream states increased their material power and capacity to utilize the Nile waters. 
They also bolstered their ideational power by collectively asserting their right to water 
utilization for development, which restrictive colonial agreements had suppressed but 
which was in fact Egypt’s rationale for building the Aswan High Dam. The upstream 
states based their case on international water laws, in particular, the 21 May 1997 
United Nations Watercourses Convention (Resolution 51/229) that calls for equitable 
and reasonable utilization of international water. They stressed the importance of the 
Nile for famine prevention. And they held out better prospects for peace and regional 
integration through hydropower projects that would bring electricity and prosperity to 
millions of Africans in the river basin and beyond. In the face of such collective 
mobilization, Egypt finds itself on the defensive, bereft of effective discursive responses 
and unable to enforce the old water agreements. The upstream riparian states have 
become the principal agents and forces shaping politics of the Nile River basin.  
 
13 
Egypt and Sudan since 2011 
Egypt’s mounting political disruption during the last decade of Mubarak’s rule 
culminated in a nationwide uprising on 25 January 2011. Mubarak’s ouster on February 
11, 2011 ended a long period of autocratic stability. But in a turbulent “transition”, 
Egypt’s first democratically elected government, headed by Mohammed Morsi of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, was overthrown by the military on 3 July 2013. The military 
preserved and expanded its power with the election of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as president in 
May 2014 but without reforming its institutions. If anything, severe political and 
economic volatility and a restive population have made Egypt more vulnerable to 
external intervention and depended on its Gulf allies.10 The regime could not end a Sinai 
Peninsula insurgency that was rooted in deprivation and local grievances (Aziz 2017). 
Nor could it demonstrate its importance to American foreign policy in the region. Indeed 
Mubarak was overthrown as the Barak Obama administration began to ‘pivot to Asia’ to 
rebalance its relationship with China. The USA was already scaling down its influence 
in the Middle East by withdrawing troops from Iraq in December 2011 and reaching the 
2015 nuclear deal with Iran called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).  
In the matter of the Nile basin the al-Sisi regime is unable to conduct a more active 
foreign policy, having to place regime security ahead of securing the Nile waters. 
Almost two weeks after Mubarak’s fall, Burundi joined the Nile Cooperative 
Framework Agreement, which Egypt opposed (Ahram Online 10 March 2011). Egypt 
faced its most serious threat when Ethiopia announced plans in April 2011 to build the 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the largest hydroelectric power project in 
Africa, located twenty kilometers from its border with Sudan. With a total storage 
capacity of 74BCM, GERD could generate 5,000 to 6,000 megawatts, three times more 
than the capacity of Egypt’s AHD. Ethiopia had been preparing to construct a major dam 
for many years. Ethiopia’s announcement of GERD without consultation with Egypt, just 
two months after Mubarak’s fall and three months before South Sudan’s independence,11 
marked a radical change in power relations between the upstream and downstream 
riparian states. A leaked audio recording shed light on Egypt’s weak position on the Nile. 
When Mubarak was asked about Egypt’s options with regards to GERD, he said, “I had 
                                                  
10 Whereas Qatar and Turkey gave strong financial support of almost $8 billion and diplomatic 
backing to Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia pumped 
billions of dollars in the forms of investments and cash deposits to help stabilize al-Sisi’s 
regime.  
11 Based on the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Bashir regime and the 
southern rebel forces of SPLM, Sudan was split into Sudan and South Sudan in January 2011.  
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then warplanes which made me able to hit the dam and destroy it in one strike.” But, 
that was no longer possible: “… you hit a dam now, you get in trouble with all 
Africans.” He added that “the whole world doesn’t take us seriously anymore. All the 
world knows we have become a weak nation. Although we held a lot of weight 
previously.”12 
In late April 2011, a 48-member popular diplomacy delegation visited Ethiopia to 
get assurances that GERD would not affect Egypt’s waters. This was followed by Egypt’s 
Prime Minister Essam Sharaf’s visit to Addis Ababa on 13 May 2011. At these meetings, 
which excluded Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt agreed to form an international panel of 
experts to review GERD. On 25 May 2011 the Egyptian Minister of Agriculture visited 
Sudan and notified it of the panel. The formation of the “international panel” was based 
on technical grounds without any legal framework that would guarantee the allocation of 
the Nile water shares before the completion of GERD. In response, Sudan’s chief 
negotiator and legal advisor, Muhammad Mufti, resigned from the Sudanese delegation 
as a legal consultant in the GERD negotiation in 2011, refusing to participate in the 
“international panel” without a legal basis. The subsequent failure of the international 
panel to meet regularly underscored Egypt-Sudan differences over the Nile basin affairs. 
From Sudan’s perspective, Egypt wanted a deal with Ethiopia that did not consider the 
Sudanese needs of the Nile waters.13  
While he was president, Bashir supported the Muslim Brotherhood and gave 
refuge to many of its members in Sudan. Yet Morsi’s election as president in June 2012 
did not substantially improve Egypt-Sudan relations. Amr Darrag, Minister of Planning 
and International Cooperation in Morsi’s government, argued that Morsi’s foreign policy 
was controlled by the military whose generals were worried about the shared Islamist 
background of the Bashir and Morsi governments and Bashir’s close ties with Iran.14 In 
fact, Egyptian-Sudanese relations under Morsi soured after Khartoum protested at 
meetings by Darfur rebel leaders with Egyptian officials and accused Cairo of stalling the 
implementation of the Four Freedoms Agreement. 15 Moreover, faced with a restive 
                                                  
12 “Mubarak: No One Takes Egypt Seriously Anymore,” Middle East Monitor, 20 June 2017. 
13 “Nile water crisis places Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia on the brink of war,” Khalil Charles, 
Middle East Monitor, January 15, 2018.  
14 Author interview with Amr Darrag, Istanbul, February 22, 2018.  
15 Signed in Cairo and published in the Official Gazette on January 9, 2004, the Four Freedoms 
Agreement guarantees to Egyptian and Sudanese citizens freedom of movement and residence, 
right to work and property in either country without a permit. The Agreement has not been 
seriously implemented.  
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population and unable to consolidate his rule, Morsi did not address the issue of GERD 
until almost a year into his presidency. Ethiopia started diverting the course of the Blue 
Nile to construct GERD in early May 2013. To stop the construction, Egyptian politicians 
meeting with Morsi proposed hostile acts against Ethiopia, including support for 
Ethiopian rebels, and sabotage.16 In June Morsi threatened to go to war if Ethiopia 
tampered with the Nile. At the Popular Conference on Egypt’s Rights to Nile Water, 
Morsi stated that, “If our share of Nile water decreases, our blood will be the alternative,” 
adding that “all options are open.” 17  The dispute with Ethiopia gave Morsi an 
opportunity to rally Egyptians behind him ahead of an anticipated June 30 protest against 
his presidency and divert public attention from the worsening economic and social 
climate. Again, regime security was vital. Crucially, the Egyptian threat against Ethiopia 
allowed Sudan to declare its neutrality and to mediate between the two disputants.  
Following Morsi’s ouster by the armed forces on 3 July 2013, the Peace and 
Security Council (PCC) of the African Union (AU) suspended Egypt from its activities 
until the “restoration of the constitutional order” 18  (July 2013 – June 2014). In 
negotiating an agreement with Ethiopia over GERD, Egypt sought to reverse its 
suspension from the AU. Sudan’s support for GERD in 2013 tipped the diplomatic 
balance in favor of Ethiopia and pushed Egypt to seek a negotiated settlement.19 The 
installation of al-Sisi as the president reinstated Egypt in the AU and paved the way for 
active engagement with Ethiopia on GERD. However, without Sudan’s support, Egypt 
was unable to counter Ethiopia’s position. Indeed, a growing rapprochement and 
convergence of interests on GERD led Sudan and Ethiopia to establish a joint military 
force to secure their common border. In the end Egypt endorses GERD in order to cut its 
loss of power and influence over the Nile hydro-politics.  
On 23 March 2015, Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia met in Khartoum and signed a 
new legal document, “The Declaration of Principles”, 20 which accepted the GERD 
project and gave Ethiopia the legal right and legitimacy to build the dam (Yihdego, 
                                                  
16 “Egypt politicians call to sabotage Ethiopia’s Nile dam project,” The National, June 4, 2013.  
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Egypt, June 11, 2013.  
18 See “Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 384th 
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Tribune, December 14, 2014. 
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Rieu-Clarke, and Cascão 2016). The agreement did not refer to the Nile Basin Initiative 
and lacked mutually accepted mechanisms to ensure each signatory’s adherence to its 
terms. More importantly, though, the agreement did not recognize Egypt’s “rights” 
according to the 1902 Treaty and other treaties, or any defined water allocation or 
distribution policies vis-a-vis Ethiopia and Sudan after the completion of GERD. In short, 
the agreement had no clause that assured Egypt its interests in the Nile. Instead, Ethiopia 
reduced Egypt’s agenda to negotiations over the timetable for filling its reservoir rather 
than Egypt’s long-held discourse on legal rights, “water security,” and water allocation. 
While GERD was being built, diplomatic negotiations and cooperation with Egypt and 
Sudan proceeded to regulate fair and reasonable use of water and resolve disputes in 
accordance with international law. Thus Ethiopia strengthened its position in 
international forums, assured of the political support of the Nile basin states and 
continued backing by China and Europe for its infrastructural projects. 
 
Sudan: Riparian Swing State 
Despite being one of Africa’s biggest economies, Egypt has not translated its long 
hydro-political alliance with Sudan into strong economic interdependency and  strategic 
ties (Tawfik 2019, 661). When Ethiopia contested Egypt’s hegemony in the Nile basin, 
therefore, Sudan could wean itself from Egyptian influence to craft an independent 
foreign policy and expand its scope for maneuver in the Nile hydro-politics. As upstream 
riparian states enforce their control of the Nile waters, Sudan has backed away from its 
previous unconditional support of Egypt’s “historic rights” to the River.  
Significantly Sudan has improved its relations with Ethiopia. Against warnings 
from experts, a large number of Sudanese officials maintain that Sudan would benefit 
from GERD and deeper economic and political ties with Ethiopia,21 whose GDP growth 
rate has been highest in Africa in the past decade. Sudan urgently needs financial support 
to stabilize its economy that is reeling from rising inflation, depreciating currency, and 
the loss of oil revenues after South Sudan’s secession in July 2011. In addition, the 
outbreak of civil war in South Sudan in 2013 deprived Sudan of much-needed pipeline 
revenues. To offset the loss of oil revenues, Sudan seeks to raise productivity in 
agriculture, its only viable economic sector, and exploit other export possibilities, notably 
                                                  
21 Author interview with Elnour Hamad, a prominent Sudanese intellectual, Virginia, USA, 
September 11, 2018. 
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livestock.22 Hence, Sudan needs the regular flow of the Nile and cheap energy supply 
from GERD that would alleviate the threat of annual floods and improve drought control 
in order to sustain year-round agriculture, and attract foreign investments from the 
Middle East and Arab Gulf states. Sudan’s intensive agricultural projects, if fully 
materialized, would increase its usage of the Nile waters and eventually require building 
more reservoirs. This prospect worries Egypt more than the Ethiopian GERD. 
Regularizing the flow of water throughout the year makes it feasible to expand irrigated 
agriculture along the Blue Nile beyond Egypt. Sudan, looking to diversify its economy 
away from oil, hopes to expand its mechanized agricultural schemes to create 
employment and export its crops.23 In this Sudan has more to gain from Ethiopia than 
Egypt.  
Being a landlocked economy, Ethiopia has sought ways to boost trade and energy 
relations with its neighbors regardless of their geopolitical differences. Ethiopia’s 
initiatives include concluding a UAE/Saudi Arabia-brokered peace treaty with Eritrea, 
exporting electricity to Sudan, Kenya and Djibouti, launching road and railway projects, 
and gaining access to Red Sea ports in Sudan, the Somaliland region of Somalia, Kenya 
and Eritrea. In particular, the geographical proximity to Ethiopia’s northern region made 
the acquisition of Port Sudan, Sudan’s largest and main sea gateway, 24  of vital 
importance to the Ethiopian government. Although feasibility studies are still needed, the 
joint Sudan-Ethiopia cross oil pipeline agreement of December 2019 should boost 
cooperation between the two states over a range of development activities.25 Those deals 
have allowed Ethiopia to improve relations with neighboring countries, diversify outlets 
and reduce port fees, a strategic trade and development imperative. Ethiopia is even 
bolstering its maritime power by reconstituting its navy, which was disbanded in 1991 
following Eritrea’s secession. A naval force at the southern entrance to the Red Sea in 
Djibouti will give Ethiopia a bigger role in the security, economic and geostrategic 
sectors in the Horn of Africa. With a military presence in the Red Sea, Addis Ababa wants 
to assure its neighbors and international investors that it can protect maritime trading 
routes from piracy, maintain access to raw materials, and secure oil and commodity flows 
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from Africa and the Middle East. Not least, Ethiopia can use its diversification of military, 
diplomatic and economic relations to its advantage in future negotiations with Egypt over 
the Nile waters.26  
 
The Rise of Non-riparian Actors in the Nile Basin 
Egypt now has also to contend with new powerful non-basin actors, namely, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These two states are expanding their influence to ensure Red 
Sea security and limit the scope of their rivals, mainly Qatar, Iran and Turkey, in the Horn 
of Africa and at major maritime chokepoints such as the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandeb and 
the Strait of Hormuz. Their long-term strategic objectives include achieving food and 
water security for their populations by channeling more financial resources to the region. 
The UAE’s USD3 billion injection of aid and investments to Ethiopia in June 2018 is one 
example of growing GCC influence.27 The commercial decisions by the Arab Gulf States 
to irrigate farms, grow export crops, and generate electricity in the Nile basin have 
significant implications for the hydro political landscape. In the wake of the 2007-2008 
global financial and food crises, the Gulf States searched for ways to reduce their 
vulnerability to shocks in the global food trade. They planned foreign agro-investments 
and major land deals to develop Sudan and other riparian states as a ‘breadbasket’ of the 
Gulf region (Lippman 2010, Woertz 2013). By the extensive use of its water and land 
resources, Sudan seeks to develop massive agricultural projects in partnership with Gulf 
Arab capital (Verhoeven 2012). Sudan now ranks first in Arab Gulf investment in 
agricultural projects and animal-based industries. The Gulf States’ investments in 
Sudan’s agriculture gives the latter confidence to chart its Nile basin policy away from 
Egypt’s concerns. The investments are chiefly drawn from the sovereign funds of the 
Gulf countries or collective funds like the Islamic Development Bank. Foreign countries, 
including China and the Arab Gulf States, are building regional influence by supporting 
major hydraulic projects in Sudan, including the Merowe Dam in 2009, the heightening 
of Roseires Dam in 2013, and food companies such as the Kenana Sugar Company, a 
joint venture between the Sudanese government, the Kuwait government, and other states 
and corporate partners (Verhoeven 2016).  
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Yet these investments have caused Ethiopia and Sudan to have tensions with 
Egypt, which fears that any overuse of the Nile upstream could reduce water flow 
northward toward its border. The former states assert their right to exploit the Nile waters 
for agricultural production and strengthen ties with the Arab oil producers. But that 
means less water for Egypt. The balance of power, affected by the Gulf States’ rising 
interests in the Nile basin, now favors Ethiopia and Sudan. In fact, Saudi Arabia used 
GERD to pressure Egypt. In October 2016, when Egypt voted in favor of a Russian 
resolution on Syria in the United Nations Security Council, Saudi Arabia halted oil 
shipments to Egypt, leaving the latter scrambling to cover the shortfall. In the following 
month, high-level Saudi officials visited GERD and formed a joint committee for 
cooperation in renewable energy. The GCC has even examined the feasibility of 
importing power produced by GERD to diversify their energy sources and save their 
petroleum for export.28 The riparian states’ lack of regional institutions and binding 
agreements on the utilization of the Nile waters have made it easy for the Gulf States to 
expand their influence in the basin through bilateral deals. In turn this situation has 
accorded Sudan and Ethiopia greater leverage and bargaining power vis-à-vis Egypt in 
their plans to build more hydroelectric stations on the Nile.  
Saudi Arabia and UAE have steadily used their political and financial clout to 
secure their interests in the Red Sea and headwaters of the Nile, both vital to Egypt’s 
national security. The rise of Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s leadership role in African-Arab 
joint actions was evident when Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia broke off ties with Iran in 
2016 after the execution of the Shia cleric in Saudi Arabia and the resultant attack by 
protesters on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran. 29  In a bilateral maritime demarcation 
agreement in 2016 that sparked public protests, Egypt handed its sovereignty over two 
strategically located islands in the Red Sea, Tiran and Sanafir, to Saudi Arabia in apparent 
gratitude for the latter’s support for Sisi’s coup against Morsi, and for future Saudi loans 
and aid. The agreement also recognized the disputed Halayeb and Shalateen region, 
located at the Egypt-Sudan border on the Red Sea’s African coast, as part of Egypt’s 
maritime border. Shortly after that Sudan-Egypt border disputes flared. Sudan called on 
Egypt to negotiate the status of two port cities or to refer their dispute to the International 
Court of Arbitration. Bashir claimed that Sudan held documents that proved its 
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sovereignty over the two “illegally occupied” cities.30 With its stronger role in the Nile 
water disputes and Egypt’s regional weakness and economic dependence on Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan was emboldened to escalate border disputes with Egypt. 
Moreover, the Gulf Crisis of June 2017, which pitted pro-Muslim Brotherhood 
Qatar against Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, also affected Sub-Saharan 
Africa whose countries were pressured to take sides in the conflict. Interestingly, Sudan 
and Ethiopia benefited from the crisis by staying neutral and continued to receive 
investments from both Qatar and the other GCC states.31 Since 2011, Sudan has signed a 
number of defense and economic agreements with the GCC states, helped Libyan rebels 
overthrow Muammar Gaddafi, and deployed thousands of Sudanese troops to join the 
2015 Saudi-led war in Yemen. In contrast, Egypt frustrated Saudi Arabia by limiting its 
participation in the war in Yemen to the symbolic deployment of air forces and naval 
ships. Egypt’s priorities are to fight against a protracted insurgency in Sinai and protect 
its western border with Libya. 
Egypt also failed to influence Sudan’s foreign policy, including its strong alliance 
with Qatar and Turkey, two of Egypt’s adversaries that are linked by their support of the 
Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt and much of the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA). Egypt has repeatedly accused Sudan of harboring members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, classified by Egyptian authorities as a “terror group” in December 2013, 
who escaped from Egypt after Morsi’s fall. Tensions arose in May 2017 when Sudan 
banned the import of agricultural and animal products from Egypt and accused Cairo of 
harboring and supporting Sudanese rebels (Reuters 30 May 2017). In December 2017 
Egypt was alarmed when Sudan signed a 99-year lease of Suakin Island to Turkey, a key 
port in the Red Sea. A few months later Qatar reportedly agreed to provide Sudan USD4 
billion to develop Suakin (Reuters March 27, 2018). The lease allows Turkey, which 
already has military bases in Somalia and Qatar, to enhance its strategic position in the 
Red Sea and develop military cooperation between the two states. Crucially, the Turkish 
presence aggravates the Egyptian-Sudanese divide over the current Nile water dispute. 
Egypt sees Qatar, Turkey, and Sudan as pro-Muslim Brotherhood countries and believes 
that their alliance would lead to a growing Sudan-Ethiopia alliance that will pressure 
Egypt over to the Halayeb border dispute.  
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Sudan’s geostrategic position makes it indispensable to Turkey. The former offers 
the latter an export market and fertile land. In November 2018 Turkey and Sudan set up a 
joint agricultural and live-stock company in Khartoum, a move that enhanced Turkey’s 
regional influence as Sudan is an important gateway to Central Africa.32 Besides being a 
valuable counterpoint to Egypt, Turkey relieves Sudan from relying too heavily on its 
unpredictable allies in the Gulf. In any case the war in Yemen and an insurgency in the 
Sinai have respectively prevented Saudi Arabia and Egypt from confronting the 
Sudan-Turkey alliance. In short regional strategic transformations have opened 
alliance-building opportunities that free Sudan from old water agreements with Egypt.  
 
Conclusion 
Egypt’s present position in the Nile basin reflects certain harsh geopolitical and 
economic realities. The academic literature and news coverage of the water dispute 
between Egypt and Ethiopia overlook the Sudan’s strategic position as a midstream state 
that accelerated the basin’s hydro political shift in Ethiopia’s favor. For as long as Sudan 
unconditionally acquiesced to Egypt’s “historic rights” to the Nile waters, Egypt enjoyed 
a water regime of near monopoly. In other words, control of Sudan gave Egypt control of 
the Nile waters. In recent times, however, Sudan has been desperate to replace revenues 
lost after its oil-rich south seceded by becoming an agricultural superpower. Sudan’s new 
economic aspiration goes against Egypt’s strategic interests in the Nile. Owing to 
GERD’s proximity downstream Sudan, Ethiopia cannot easily draw water for irrigated 
agriculture. What makes Sudan such an important player in the Nile dispute is 
Khartoum’s potential ability to expand its irrigated agriculture which would lower the 
volume of the Nile waters flowing into Egypt. Adding to the complexity of regional 
relations, the GCC sovereign wealth funds have enlarged their stake in irrigated 
agriculture and farming schemes in the Nile basin. The developmental projects these 
funds support may exacerbate existing water scarcity due to climate change and rapid 
population growth. Moreover, the regional order, from the Nile basin to the Red Sea, is 
being molded by new actors, notably, China, Turkey, and, above all, the GCC states, each 
with its own economic and security interests. Egypt’s internal turmoil, from the 2011 
uprising to the 2013 coup and beyond, and the rising power of the upstream riparian states 
have combined to allow Sudan to withdraw from its previous alliance with Egypt. In a 
new geopolitical landscape, Sudan has played different sides of the divides in the Middle 
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East and the Nile basin. Sudan’s leaders are ideologically closer to Qatar and Turkey. But 
in practice, Sudan’s cash-short government retains a strong alliance with Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE. Politically, Saudi Arabia and the UAE want to prevent any re-emergence of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. However, calculations of food security draw Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE closer to Sudan and Ethiopia which plan to utilize the Nile waters for 
energy, irrigation and the needs of growing populations. In a way, the Nile dispute is a 
classic diplomatic problem: every side to the dispute sees its security being bound up with 
the river waters. Yet negotiation and cooperation can resolve what self-aggrandizement 
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